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INTRODUCTioN-RELATION TO OPA STANDARDS
To a considerable extent, OPS policies and standards drew upon the experience
of its wartime predecessor, the Office of Price Administration,' including the very
important decision that explicit policies and standards were indispensable for sound
and effective administration. However, OPS standards differed from those em-
ployed by OPA in many significant respects, both because OPA experience indicated
the need for change and because of the very considerable difference in economic
and political conditions.
The availability of the OPA background in this respect was both an advantage
and a handicap. It was an advantage for the obvious reason that much of the pre-
liminary spade work had been done so that the job of formulating and applying
policies and standards did not have to start from scratch. It was a handicap in that
it tended to direct policy formulation into the patterns made familiar by OPA and,
consequently, to restrict and delay the exploration of new approaches to the prob-
lems which developed.
Moreover, OPS operated under conditions which differed in many important
respects from those which had confronted its wartime predecessor. In the first place,
the onset of wartime inflation was much less abrupt than that following Korea. In
1940 there was a large volume of unemployed resources, and the initial impact of
price increases was largely confined to the commodities directly affected by the war
in Europe. Price pressures spread only gradually; consequently wartime price con-
trols started from selected regulations covering a limited number of commodities
and were progressively extended to cover the entire economy. The fact that there
had been time for this gradual approach resulted in a reasonably balanced price
structure at the time OPA imposed its general freeze at the end of April, 1942. In
the case of OPS, on the other hand, the much more rapid inflationary price rise that
preceded across-the-board action resulted in the freezing of a highly distorted price
structure and made prompt action to remedy these distortions imperative. The de-
velopment of policies appropriate for this purpose was a long and difficult task and
one for which OPA experience offered inadequate guideposts.
In the second place, most OPA standards and policies were adapted to the acute
general inflationary pressures which persisted through most of that agency's life
and were consistent with, and supported by, the "hold-the-line" order issued by
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President Roosevelt in April, 1943. Rigid application of these standards was facili-
tated by the wartime psychology. In contrast, soft spots began to appear in some
markets soon after OPS issued its general freeze and during subsequent months
this "mixed market" situation spread progressively. There was no all-out war to
generate public support for a really tough program; consequently, standards could
neither be drawn as tightly nor applied as rigidly as had been possible under OPA.
And it is doubtful whether such a tough program would have been justified, even
if there had been public psychology to support it.
Despite these important differences, OPS found that many of the OPA standards,
appropriately modified, did give workable answers to a large proportion of the
problems which arose. While this does not mean that more radical modifications
or even completely new approaches might not have worked equally well or perhaps
better, it does indicate that the basic problems encountered by any price control
program bear a marked similarity despite major differences in the underlying eco-
nomic situation.
It is clear, for example, that price control officials will always be confronted with
the problem of deciding whether a general increase in prices is justified for a par-
ticular industry and how much such an increase should be. It does not necessarily
follow that the best answer to this question is to be found in an Industry Earnings
Standard of the kind used by OPA and OPS, though some form of earnings test
would almost surely have to be applied.
Similarly, problems will arise with respect to price adjustments for specific
products or product lines and for individual firms or groups of firms. Answers to
these problems will have to be found, though there may be better answers than those
provided by the Product Standard for product lines or by the individual relief stand-
ard for firms or groups of firms.
Since it is likely that any future price control program will be associated with
some form of national mobilization, provision would also have to be made to avoid
interference with essential supply. Finally, policies would also have to be established
to permit the orderly termination of controls when the emergency which requires
them is over.
Obviously, the policies and standards adopted in any future price control program
should not be automatically patterned after those which have been used with more
or less success in the past. They would have to be adapted to the conditions then
prevailing and to the legislative authority under which they operate. But, while
the experience of the past may not offer the best answers to the problems of the
future, it can at least indicate the nature of many of the issues which will arise and
the merits and faults of the courses which were adopted.
WHY STANDARDs Ayx NEEDED
The administration of price control in the huge and complex American economy
calls for the issuance of hundreds of general price regulations, thousands of amend-
ments to such regulations, and literally tens of thousands of individual actions
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establishing or modifying specific prices for individual firms or groups of firms.
Every one of these actions has a direct and significant impact on the operations and
profits of at least some companies. Taken together, these actions have a profound
effect upon business, upon production, and upon the stability of the economy as .a
whole. Standards are needed both to protect the rights of the individual firm or
industry and to promote the success of the over-all program.
The task of formulating these regulations, amendments, and individual price
actions must be done by a large number of officials of different backgrounds and
prejudices and of varying degrees of experience and competence. In the absence
of fairly explicit guides, it would be impossible to expect any consistent approach
to the problems presented. Some officials would tend to be too generous; others too
rigid. Prices for some industries and firms would be set too high to be consistent
with sound stabilization; others would be set so low as to impose serious hardship
or to interfere with production. In the absence of agency-wide OPS standards,
businessmen would have had no way of knowing whether they were being fairly
and consistently treated, orderly administration would have been impossible, and
the agency's actions would have been subject to constant and proper challenge in
the courts.
Thus, on April 16, 1952, Mr. Ellis Arnall, then Director of the Office of Price
Stabilization, made the following statement before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare in connection with the pending request of the steel industry for
a price increase in excess of that allowable under OPS standards:
In order to decide which requests for price increases should be granted and which
should be denied, we must have rules by which we can say "no" to some demands for
price increases, and "yes" to others. Without such rules, price control could not operate.
If price increases were permitted because the people in an industry were "gentlemen,"
or belonged to the right political party, or because they screamed the loudest, government
by law would have disappeared, and freedom and individual rights would have perished.
In this connection, the Defence Production Act2 specifically provided that every
action, regulation, or order "shall be accompanied by a statement of considerations
involved in the issuance of such regulation or order." (Sec. 402-c). This require-
ment was patterned after that contained in the Price Control Act of I942,a which
constituted at the time an innovation in American administrative law 4 While this
provision did not constitute a requirement that all actions taken by the agency con-
form with established and stated policies and standards, it is clear that a Statement
of Considerations always stood on much firmer ground when it could be described
as a specific application of an agency-wide rule.
At least equally important with the need for equitable and even-handed treat-
ment was the need for standards in order to facilitate the success of the program as
a whole. The total effect of price control is represented by the sum of th actions
'64 STAT. 798, 803 (I950), 50 U. S. C. App. §2Io2(C) (Supp. x952).
256 STAr. 24 (942), as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §9o2 (1946).
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taken with respect to individual industries, commodities, and companies. Experi-
ence has repeatedly demonstrated the great difficulty of isolating the impact of
price increases in any important sector of the economy, as illustrated by the prob-
lems OPS encountered following the steel price-wage settlement in August, 1952.
Even in the case of commodities or industries of lesser importance, price increases
have a strong tendency to spread and to generate cumulative pressures in other
fields. Pressures for unnecessary and unjustified price increases can only be resisted
effectively when there are dearly defined ground rules setting forth when and to
what extent such increases may be granted. In fact, the life of operating officials
would have been rendered immeasurably more difficult had they not been able to
support their resistance to unjustified demands for price increases by referring to
the limitations imposed upon them by the applicable policy or standard.
On the other hand, it should be recognized that the issuance of administrative
standards and policies has the inevitable effect of reducing flexibility of action.
Even the Director himself is necessarily bound by the policy he has established for
the guidance of his staff. A clear breach of standards in any case, no matter how
meritorious, imperils the continued maintenance of the standard; a series of such
breaches would render .the standard untenable. The fact that OPS standards were
made public as a matter of policy enhances the difficulties in this regard.
On balance, nevertheless, it is clear that the advantages of having explicit stand-
ards far outweigh their disadvantages. Consequently, OPS very early decided that
it would follow the precedent established by OPA in the interest of sound, even-
handed, effective administration.
STANDARDS CONTAINED IN ni LAW
The Office of Price Stabilization derived its authority from the Defense Pro-
duction Act of i95o and its subsequent Amendments in 1951 and I952.' This Act
established certain standards for the agency's operations and certain limitations on
the exercise of its authority. These standards and limitations varied considerably
in the degree to which they supplied precise guides for the agency's operation,
though the limitations were, of course, more specific by their nature than the
general standards.
Thus, Section 401 (50 U. S. C. App. §2ioi (Supp. 1952)) set forth the basic
purposes of the Act; Section 402(a) (50 U. S. C. App. §21o2(a) (Supp. 1952))
authorized the President to promote voluntary action to further these objectives;
and Section 4o2(b) (50 U. S. C. App. §2102(b) (Supp. 1952)) established the con-
ditions under which selective ceilings could be imposed.
Section 402(c) (50 U. S. C. App. §2102(c) (Supp. 1952)) established certain gen-
eral criteria. In particular, it directed the President, so far as practicable to "ascertain
and give due consideration to comparable prices ...which he finds to be repre-
sentative of those prevailing during the period from May 24, i95o to June 24, 1950,
164 STAT. 798 (195o), as amended, 65 STAT. 131 (I95i), as amended, 66 STAr. 296 (1952), 50
U. S. C. App. §2o61 (Supp. 1952).
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inclusive." It also stated that "in determining and adjusting ceilings . . . he [the
President] should give due consideration to such relevant factors as . .. Specula-
tive fluctuations, general increases or decreases in cost of production, distribution,
and transportation, and general increases or decreases in profits . . . subsequent to
June 24, 1950."
Obviously, none of these general instructions could, by themselves, furnish even
an approximate answer as to the level at which price ceilings should be set aside or
when and how they should be modified or adjusted. Perhaps the nearest thing to
a specific instruction contained in these sections was that in Section 402(c) just de-
scribed, but this paragraph indicated neither the extent of the consideration to be
given within the limits of "practicability" to prices in the pre-Korean month nor
the nature of the allowance to be made for changes in conditions since that period.
The broad requirement in Section 402(c) that price ceilings be "generally fair
and equitable" was the same as that contained in OPA enabling legislation. It was
clearly up to the agency, however, to define the meaning of fairness and equity on
a basis which would conform with the intent of Congress and which would be ac-
ceptable to the courts. (Presumably the courts might expect that, in the absence
of clearly distinguishing circumstances, the OPS interpretation of this phrase should
draw on the OPA precedent.)
In addition to these very broad provisions, the Act and its subsequent amend-
ments contained a considerable number of more specific directives. Among the more
important of these were the following:
i. Section 4o2(d) (-) (50 U. S. C. App. §21o2(d) (3) (Supp. 1952)) of the Act
set forth detailed rules regarding the minimum levels at which ceiling prices for
agricultural commodities could be established. It also provided that ceilings for
commodities "processed or manufactured in whole or substantial part from any
agricultural commodity" could not be established or maintained below levels which
would reflect to the farmer a price at least equal to the minima set forth in the Act.
Subsequent amendments further restricted the discretion of the agency with respect
to agricultural prices.
2. Section 4o2(d) (4) of the Act, the so-called Capehart Amendment of July,
1951," limited OPS authority with respect to price rollbacks and permitted indi-
vidual sellers to obtain adjustments in their ceiling prices on the basis of their pre-
Korean prices adjusted for all cost increases up to July 26, 1951 other than those
which "the President may determine to be unreasonable or excessive."
3. The Herlong Amendment of i95 if provided that no regulation "shall hereafter
be issued . . . which shall deny to sellers of materials at retail or wholesale their
customary percentage margins over costs of the materials during the period May 24,
i95o to June 24, 1950." In 1952, this rule was further amended' by making it
applicable to all regulations previously issued.
865 STAT. 134 (1951), 50 U. S. C. App. §21o2(d)( 4 ) (Supp. 1952).
65 STAT. 134 (1951), 50 U. S. C. App. §21o2(k) (Supp. 1952).866 STAT. 296 (1952).
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Provisions of these kinds were, of course, considerably more specific than those
setting forth the purpose of the Act, the general conditions under which ceilings
might be imposed, or the broad requirement of fairness and equity. Nevertheless,
they still left considerable room for interpretation.
For example, the rule that ceilings for commodities produced from agricultural
products must reflect at least the minima set forth for farmers in the Act raised a
long series of difficult administrative questions, such as the magnitude of the margins
to be preserved between the raw product and the processed item, the consideration
that should be given to the value of inventories in the hands of processors during
periods of changing prices, and, very importantly, the price relationships which
should be maintained between the joint products of a single agricultural commodity.
The difficulties of this last problem were enhanced by the fact that market condi-
tions frequently make it impossible for processors to realize the established ceilings
for some of these joint products, while ceilings for others could be obtained. Issues
of this kind arose in connection with such items as beef and cattle by-products and
oil and meal from oilseeds (particularly soybeans).
In connection with the Capehart Amendment, it was necessary to determine
what costs were to be regarded as "unreasonable or excessive," to prescribe the man-
ner in which cost increases up to July 26, 1951 were to be computed, and to de-
termine the extent to which individual segments of a manufacturer's operation could
be considered in isolation. It was also unclear as to whether the amendment applied
to distributors. The agency took the position that it did not, but was reversed by
the courts. Subsequently, however, a further amendment to the Act in I9529 cleared
up this ambiguity by supporting the agency's initial interpretation of the Con-
gressional intent.
While the objective of the Herlong Amendment was clear, it, too, raised many
questions of interpretation. As will be shown below, the concept of "customary per-
centage margins over cost" was peculiarly difficult to define.
In all such cases, therefore, it was necessary for OPS to interpret the precise mean-
ing and intent of these statutory provisions and to develop rules for their applica-
tion. Obviously, such rules had to be as nearly uniform as practicable. Thus, in the
case of the Capehart Amendment, to mention one example, it would have been
clearly inappropriate to permit arbitrary differences in the ways in which cost in-
creases were computed by different industries or companies, or to accept a par-
ticular kind of cost increase as valid with respect to one seller while regarding it as
"unreasonable or excessive" in relation to another seller.
Finally, the Act exempted a considerable number of commodities and services
from control and this list was successively expanded in 1951 and i952.1° In most
cases, the language of the Act, in defining these exemptions, was sufficiently precise
for direct application, as, for example, when it exempted "books, magazines, mo-
o Ibid.
"064 STAr. 803 (195o), 65 STAT. 134 (i95i), 66 STAT. 296 (952), 50 U. S. C. App. §2,o2(e)
(Supp. 1952).
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tion pictures, periodicals, or newspapers" and "prices charged and wages paid for
services performed by barbers and beauticians." Even in the case of exemptions, how-
ever, there were some problems which required interpretation. Thus, the 1952
Amendment provided that "no ceiling shall be established or maintained under this
title for fruits or vegetables in fresh or processed form." While it was perfectly clear
that this prohibited the maintenance of price ceilings on canned vegetables, it was
less clear whether it applied also to such items as canned vegetable soup or jams
and jellies.
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It is evident, therefore, that the standards contained in the Act were not, and
could not, in general, be sufficiently detailed to indicate the levels at which price
ceilings should be established or when such ceilings should be modified for an
industry, a firm or a commodity. Administrative policies and standards were
needed to supply such guidance. These standards took a variety of forms. Some
were included in "Price Operations Memoranda" issued by the Director of Price
Operations. Others were incorporated in General Overriding Regulations, and
some were included in specific Ceiling Price Regulations. The provisions in
these regulations were usually supplemented and made more detailed in Price Op-
rating Instructions issued for the guidance of the officials responsible for administer-
ing them. The form was, however, secondary; they all had the same purpose of
providing ground rules as precise as possible for the exercise of the price control
authority.
The most urgent problem which confronted the agency immediately after the
issuance of the General Ceiling Price Regulation was that of remedying the dis-
tortions which resulted from the freeze. The circumstances under which prices had
been frozen resulted in inordinately high ceiling levels for some commodities
and services, and in levels for others so low as to result in severe hardship and to
threaten interference with continued production and distribution.
The nature of the policies adopted to remedy these distortions can best be
described in relation to the different kinds of problems presented by the distributive
trades, imported commodities, manufactured goods, and services.
A. The Distributive Trades
The difficulties in the case of the distributive trades were due largely to the
inevitable lag between the movements in prices charged by producers and those
charged by wholesalers and retailers. Fortunately, the availability of the OPA ex-
perience made it possible to act promptly in this field. Regulations were accordingly
issued in rapid succession establishing ceiling prices for a large segment of non-food
retailing and for most food retailing and wholesaling on the basis of current invoice
costs plus normal distributive margins. These regulations were closely patterned
after those which had been issued by OPA and, as a result, some of the margins
established were based upon fairly old data. While this resulted in some difficulties
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and probably in some inequities, these regulations proved generally workable and
were retained with only minor modifications to the end of the control period.
Additional regulations were issued gradually covering the remainder of the
wholesale and retail fields. For the most part, these conformed to the basic pattern
employed in the earlier actions, though the precise nature of each regulation was
adapted to the specific situation involved. In the case of beef retailing and whole-
saling, for example, specific dollars-and-cents ceilings were established, but these
were based upon livestock ceiling prices prevailing at the time and normal dis-
tributive margins. The use of dollars-and-cents ceilings was necessary because of
the administrative difficulties involved in the use of the straight margin technique.
It was felt that the administrative advantages of spelled out dollars-and-cents prices
more than compensated for the fact that ceilings would not be automatically reduced
as primary market prices fell. Upward adjustments would not be needed as long
as livestock ceilings were unchanged.
In the case of most non-food wholesaling, Supplementary Regulation 2911 to
General Ceiling Price Regulation permitted, in effect, a one-time adjustment of
prices to restore normal margins where these had been squeezed under the freeze.
Further increases were permitted or decreases required only in a limited number
of special cases. The complexity of the situation in this field was such that the
continued readjustment of ceiling prices to conform with changing purchase costs
did not seem practical or appropriate.
In its broadest aspects, the standard implied in these regulations was therefore
a fairly simple one. In general, it meant that prices charged by retailers and whole-
salers would be permitted to fluctuate with their purchase costs on a basis which
would preserve, as far as possible, their customary distributive margins.
For a considerable period of time, however, one basic issue of principle remained
unsettled. If distributive margins were maintained at the same percentage over
cost, their magnitude in dollars-and-cents would, of course, increase as the cost of
the commodities rose. At the same time, the operating costs of many distributors
were also rising to some extent, reflecting such factors as higher wages, rentals, and
utility rates as well as increased financial carrying charges due to the rising costs
of the merchandise. In some distributive trades such as the metals trades, such
changes in operating costs were relatively unimportant and, as a result, the normal
practice in these trades has been to mark up merchandise by a uniform dollars-and-
cents amount rather than by a customary percentage. In most consumer goods
fields, however, this increase in operating costs was significant, and markups in
those trades are usually calculated in terms of percentages.
Early OPS policy, however, did not accept the maintenance of customary per-
centage margins in all such cases as an invariable rule. The rise in prices since
Korea had widened dollars-and-cents margins substantially, and it was felt that in
some cases, at least, distributors should not be allowed to "mark up" further in-
11 16 FE. RG. 5011 (xg5x).
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creases in merchandise costs. In several instances, therefore, OPS, upon approving
an increase in manufacturers' prices, decided to permit distributors to pass-through
only the absolute amount of such increase rather than to allow the usual percentage
markup to be added. This was done, for example, in connection with soft-surface
floor coverings and with automobiles.
Naturally, this policy evoked vigorous protests from the trades affected. As
a direct result of these protests, Congress, in extending the Act in July, 1951, added
the Herlong Amendment'" which required that all subsequently issued regulations
provide for the maintenance of "customary percentage margins" for all distributors.
For the time being, previously issued regulations were unaffected but, as a result
of continuing pressure, the renewal of the Act in the summer of I952 " extended this
requirement to all such regulations as well. The Amendment was, however, further
modified to prohibit OPS from issuing or retaining in effect any regulation "which
shall deny sellers of materials at retail or wholesale their customary percentage
margins over costs of the materials or their customary charges" during the pre-
Korean period. The addition of the phrase, "or their customary charges," appeared
to confirm the OPS interpretation of the earlier amendment that it could continue
requiring the use of dollars-and-cents margins in those trades where that practice
had been customary.
Complying with this Congressional action, OPS promptly (Aug. 27, 1952) issued
General Overriding Regulation 33,4 permitting distributors to apply for relief if
they believed that the regulations applicable to them did not comply with the new
amendment. However, the change in the status of what had been a flexible admin-
istrative policy into a strict legal requirement led to considerable complications.
It made it necessary for the agency to be prepared in each case to defend its regula-
tory margins as being at least equal to "customary percentage margins" or, where
it could be demonstrated that these did not exist, as conforming to "customary
charges."
This was often quite difficult. Even where the use of percentage margins was
customary, it did not follow that "customary percentage margins" were readily de-
terminable. Thus, a special survey of food distribution revealed very wide differ-
ences in the margins charged by the same kinds of stores for the same classes of
commodities in the same or similar localities. Moreover, the use of different sta-
tistical techniques-each valid in principle-to determine the "customary" level
yielded quite different results in practice. Controversy between the food trade and
the agency with respect to whether its regulations conformed to the statutory re-
quirement persisted until the end of the control program.
In short, OPS experience reinforced that of OPA in the conclusion that some
form of margin control is the most appropriate technique for use in the regulation
of prices charged by most retailers and wholesalers. It also shows, however, that
" Supra, note 7.
13 Supra, note 8.
it "7 Fn. REG. 7852 (1952).
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this general technique cannot be applied in all cases and that there must be con-
siderable administrative flexibility in adapting it to individual situations. Finally,
the expression of such a general technique in the form of a specific statutory re-
quirement raised very serious administrative difficulties, partly because the concept
of "customary percentage margins" or even "customary charges" contained in the
statute does not apply at all to many trades and is extremely difficult to define pre-
cisely in others.
B. Imports
The freeze also presented extremely urgent problems in connection with the
prices of imported commodities. OPS had, of course, no direct control over the prices
charged by foreign sellers. While it could limit the price paid by an American pur-
chaser abroad, such authority would have been very difficult to exercise in the great
bulk of cases. As far as the freeze was concerned, it limited only the prices charged
in this country by resellers of imported goods.
Unlike the problems involved in distribution, OPA experience was of only
limited value in relation to imports. In the first place, foreign trade in most basic
commodities was under rigid international control during the war, both as to alloca-
tion and price. Second, the range of imports was greatly limited as a result of
wartime conditions; thus, the normal flow of miscellaneous manufactured goods from
Europe to the United States was almost completely cut off. Under OPS, in contrast,
there were no international price controls, allocation controls were much more lim-
ited and less rigidly enforced, and the range of commodities to be dealt with was
that normally encountered in peace time.
This does not mean that ceilings on the resale prices of imports could have no
effect. In practice, the United States is so large a factor in many world markets
that it could force foreign prices down in many cases by simply maintaining domestic
resale ceilings. For many commodities, however, any such attempt to hold prices
down would simply have resulted in the loss of needed supplies. Moreover, even
where this danger did not exist, this power had to be used carefully in order to
avoid creating serious ill will abroad. In fact, this problem of international rela-
tions could never be lost sight of in connection with import price control. This does
not, of course, mean that the interests of some foreign countries in obtaining as high
as possible a price for their exports to the United States could be regarded as over-
riding the basic stabilization objectives. On the other hand, it was equally clear
that friendly relations could not be maintained if the legitimate interests of ex-
porting countries were ignored.
This was recognized by the Office of Price Stabilization from the outset. Even
before the GCPR was issued, officials of the ESA and State Department met with
representatives of Latin American countries, explaining the need for initiating price
controls and stating that, to the extent possible, these countries would be con-
sulted with respect to actions which had a major effect on their interests. When
the General Ceiling Price Regulation was being drafted, the agency consulted with
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the State Department with respect to the provisions dealing with imports. At the
request of the Department, the following paragraph was included in the Statement
of Considerations of the GCPR:
Opportunity will be afforded, through arrangements to be made by the Department of
State, for consideration by the Director of Price Stabilization of the views of foreign
governments regarding adjustments of ceiling prices of commodities which are of special
concern to them.
While thus recognizing the broader aspects of the import problem, the direct
job of OPS was price stabilization, and its top officials consequently were from
the start advocates of a "tough" import price policy. However, virtually all other
government agencies, for many different reasons, favored a more liberal policy, and
in general OPS found itself unable to "hold-the-line" successfully.
Two general categories of imports can be distinguished. The first comprises
the basic raw materials, including strategic items such as tin, chromium, and tung-
sten, and such essential civilian materials as coffee, wool, and wood pulp. The
importance of these goods, and the very diverse considerations affecting each, made
the development of any generally applicable standard impractical. A case-by-case
approach was followed, under which what actually happened was that ceilings were
generally raised-however reluctantly-wherever pressures were strong, while ceil-
ings were maintained when there was little or no pressure on prices-that is, where
prices would not have advanced significantly in any event. For only a few of
these basic items, such as coffee, cocoa, and possibly wool, can it be said that ceilings
effectively held down prices.
The second category includes the wide range of manufactured and semi-manu-
factured goods of all kinds, comprising many thousands of individual commodities.
Here a case-by-case approach would have been impractical, and some general
standard was essential. Following extensive inter- and intra-agency discussion, the
General Import Regulation-CPR 31L-was issued, applicable to virtually all man-
ufactured goods as well as to some of the less important raw materials. This regula-
tion permitted each importer to determine his ceilings on the basis of his current
landed costs and his customary margins. The margins for importers who did not
sell at retail were, however, determined on a dollars-and-cents rather than a per-
centage basis, both in order to minimize the inflationary impact and in the belief
that this would induce importers to resist unnecessary price increases abroad. In
the case of importing retailers, percentage margins were allowed.
The use of dollars-and-cents margins for other than importing retailers instead
of percentage markups evoked substantial objection and controversy. Many im-
porters argued that their costs of doing business had increased very substantially
and that some costs, such as financing and commissions, varied directly with the
cost of the imported product. They pointed also to the fact that a similar problem
had arisen under OPA and that that agency had resolved the difficulty by permitting
in i6 FED. REG. 4184 (195).
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the use either of dollars-and-cents margins or of 75 per cent of the normal percentage
margins, whichever was higher. For reasons which were never clearly stated, OPA
precedent was not followed by OPS.
Pressure to modify the dollars-and-cents rule, at least to the extent allowed by
OPA, continued intensively after the regulation was issued. 6 To a considerable
extent, however, this pressure seems to have been based more on issues of principle
than on actual business hardship. As a practical matter, the general easing of world
markets, coupled with the fact that the regulation had been somewhat loosely drawn,
seems to have prevented any really serious problems from developing.
When the Herlong Amendment was made applicable in 1952 to all regulations
previously issued, importers as well as other distributors were permitted to apply
for relief under the provisions of GOR 2 3 17 if they could show that they were unable
to obtain their customary percentage margins under CPR-3 i. As a result of the
factors just described, however, little if any use appears to have been made of this
relief by any importer or groups of importers.
Nevertheless, pressure to modify the regulation as a matter of principle continued
and a proposed change was in the draft stage at the time all controls were terminated.
Had world markets continued to rise, it seems highly probable that OPS would have
been forced to modify its position much more promptly, perhaps along the lines of
the OPA regulation, even in the absence of the Herlong Amendment. It is difficult,
in fact, to defend on any purely logical basis the principle of limiting importers to
their customary dollars-and-cents margins while permitting most other distributors,
including importing retailers, to operate on the basis of percentage margins. There
may, however, be cogent reasons for imposing some squeeze on importers' customary
percentage margins as was done by OPA, but it would seem appropriate to give
some recognition to the fact that a considerable part of the operating costs of
many importers does vary with the landed costs of the products they handle.
C. Manufacturing Industry
The problems which confronted OPS as a result of the freeze in the broad field
of manufacturing had no counterpart in OPA experience. The reasons for this have
already been described. New ground had to be broken and new policies developed.
There were various possible ways in which the job of remedying price distor-
tions in manufacturing industry could have been attacked. Theoretically, one possi-
bility would have been to proceed immediately to the preparation and issuance of
"tailored" regulations for each industry which would have established ceilings ap-
propriate to each specific case. Unfortunately, there were two serious difficulties
which made such a course appear impractical. In the first place, the agency staff
was too small and many of them were too new and untrained to permit such a job
"0 This pressure came not only from the trade, but also through diplomatic channels. For example,
on January i6, 1952, Assistant Secretary of State Willard Thorp wrote Price Director DiSalle transmitting
and in effect endorsing a communication from the British Embassy urging a change to the percentage
margins basis.
17 r6 FaD. REO. 12718 (595i).
566 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
to be completed within a reasonable span of time. It seemed most unlikely that
the tailoring process could proceed rapidly enough to cope with the large and in-
creasing volume of complaints from industries and individual concerns that had
been caught by the freeze in a seriously unfavorable position. Second, the problem
of establishing appropriate price relationships between vertically related industries
would have been very difficult to handle by treating each individual industry
separately. For example, ceiling prices for apparel could not have been determined
without reference to the levels for textiles; prices for consumers' durable goods would
have depended upon the levels established for metals and parts; and prices for
paper products upon the ceilings for pulp and paper. This would have meant,
in effect, that definitive regulations for finished goods generally would have had to
await the completion of regulations for raw materials and semi-manufacturers. This
delay would have been particularly serious because it was precisely in the finished
goods area that the pressures for adjustment were most acute.
In view of these considerations, it was decided that across-the-board action for
most manufacturing industry was necessary. Accordingly, a group of regulations
known as the "Manufacturers' Regulations" was issued, starting April 25, i95i.
These included CPR 22 (the Manufacturers' General Ceiling Price Regulation),"'
CPR 30 (Machinery and Related Manufactured Goods),"9 CPR 37 (Primary Cotton
Textile Manufacturers' Regulation)," ° CPR 41 (Shoe Manufacturers' Regulation),21
and CPR 45 (Apparel Manufacturers' General Ceiling Price Regulation).2 (CPR
8, Wool Yarns and Fabrics,"3 which had been previously issued, was amended to
conform with the same problem.) While these varied somewhat in detail, they all
followed the general approach which had been incorporated in the Manufacturers'
General Ceiling Price Regulation.
The principal features of this approach were as follows:
Each manufacturer was permitted to select as a "base period" for each category
of commodities one of the four calendar quarters between July i, 1949 and June
24, 1950.24 For each commodity he then determined the highest price which he had
charged during this base period and added to that price the increases in the costs of
factory labor and purchased manufacturing materials which had occurred between
the end of the base period and certain specified "cut-off" dates. Thus, in the case
of labor, each manufacturer could take account of increases in factory labor costs up
to March 15, i95r. As regards materials, a general distinction was made between
those which were themselves subject to one of the manufacturers' regulations and
those which were not. For most of the former, only those cost increases which
had occurred up to December 31, i95o could be taken into account; for most of
the latter, increases through March i5, 1951 could be included. This distinction was
made because it was assumed that the operation of these regulations would result
28x6 FED. REG. 3562 (i95i). "Id. at 4108 (x951). 20Id. at 4644 (1955).
"Id. at 5044 (95x). "Id. at 5753 (95). 23Id. at 3039 (I95).
" The last of these periods, namely, April x to June 24, 1950, was, of course, six days short of a
calendar quarter, but the June 24 date was used since it coincided with the Korean outbreak.
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in many rollbacks, particularly for materials in the early stages of fabrication, and
that these rollbacks would result in a level of prices approximating that of December
31 rather than March 15.
These regulations, in effect, constituted the first important agency-wide standard
of general applicability. Specifically, they established the following basic principles:
i. The agency refused to accept the validity of any price ceiling merely because it had
been frozen under the GCPR and expressly undertook to roll back prices which had
risen too rapidly while at the same time affording relief where needed.
2. In general, the ceiling price level appropriate for any manufacturing industry should
be determined by adjusting its pre-Korean price level to take account of increases in di-
rect costs up to certain specific cut-off dates.
3. By the same token, automatic, continued cost escalation was definitely rejected. In
other words, the agency would not regard cost increases occurring after the specified
dates as automatically entitling an industry to an equivalent increase in ceiling prices.
This explicit rejection of any form of automatic cost escalation was regarded as
one of the most fundamental bulwarks of any effective price control program. The
reasons for this were expressed as follows in the Statement of Considerations ac-
companying CPR 22:
The Problem of Cost Absorption
In adopting as its basic principle the adjustment of pre-Korean price levels to take
account of the increase in manufacturing costs which has occurred since Korea, this
regulation follows the only practicable method of restoring a balanced and generally
equitable priqe structure that is available. This should not, however, be interpreted as
constituting an acceptance or endorsement of the principle of automatic or indefinite cost
escalation. It would be wholly unsound to base any continuing price control program
or policy on the assumption that increases in costs should be automatically reflected in
increases in price. This would result not in price control, but rather in rubber-stamped
inflation.
No system of price control can do its job if each increase in costs is immediately and
automatically translated into rising prices. Such a policy would leave us within the very
same vicious circle of cost and price increases which it must be the primary object of
any stabilization program to break.
Consequently, the cost-plus principle is incorporated in the present regulation only to
a limited extent. It is used as the best available device for reestablishing a balanced and
equitable price structure and should not be construed as implying any guarantee of profit
levels. ...
It is particularly important to emphasize that this regulation allows only for past
increases and carries with it no implication that increases which may occur subsequently
will be treated on a similar automatic basis. . . . It is, of course, true that cost increases
after March 15 are just as real as those which occurred before that date. However, as
pointed out above, if price controls are to be real and not illusory, the cost-price cycle
must be broken at some point. The cut-off date of March 15 is one of the ways in which
the break in this price-cost cycle must be accomplished. The date is, to some extent,
arbitrary, but some date had to be set ....
It should be emphasized that selection of the March 15 date does not mean that cost
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increases after that date will be ignored.... If it should develop that for any industry,
the ceilings calculated under this regulation do not satisfy the basic pricing standards
shortly to be promulgated, the industry is invited to submit the facts necessary to demon-
strate this condition. .. . Upon a proper showing of facts, the Director is prepared to
take such action as is required to make the ceilings generally fair and equitable to each
such industry....
The issuance of these regulations, together with other attempted rollbacks initi-
ated by OPS, particularly in the field of livestock and beef generated a storm of
protest from business. In view of the time needed by manufacturers to complete
the fairly complex calculations required by these regulations, the effective date,
originally set at May 28, 1951, was extended to July 2, 195i. As it happened, the
original Defense Production Act expired on June 30 before Congress had been able
to complete work on its extension. Consequently, an interim extension was ap-
proved by Congress but this specifically barred any rollback actions. When the
Act was finally extended on July 31, i95i, it included the so-called Capehart Amend-
ment which made necessary a thorough re-examination of the policies contemplated
in the Manufacturers' Regulations.
The text of this Amendment follows :25
Sec. 4o2(d)( 4). After the enactment of this paragraph no ceiling price on any material
(other than an agricultural commodity) or on any service shall become effective which
is below the lower of (A) the price prevailing just before the date of issuance of the
regulation or order establishing such ceiling price, or (B) the price prevailing during the
period January 25, 1951, to February 24, 1951, inclusive. Nothing in this paragraph shall
prohibit the establishment or maintenance of a ceiling price with respect to any material
(other than an agricultural commodity) or service which (i) is based upon the highest
price between January i, 195o, and June 24, 1950, inclusive, if such ceiling price reflects
adjustments for increases or decreases in costs occurring subsequent to the date on which
such highest price was received and prior to July 26, 1951, or (2) is established under
a regulation issued prior to the enactment of this paragraph. Upon application and a
proper showing of his prices and costs by any person subject to a ceiling price, the Presi-
dent shall adjust such ceiling price in the manner prescribed in clause (i) of the pre-
ceding sentence. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "costs" includes material,
indirect and direct labor, factory, selling, advertising, office, and all other production,
distribution, transportation and administration costs, except such as the President may
determine to be unreasonable and excessive.
In effect, this Amendment did two things. With respect to all future regulations,
it modified the formula incorporated in the Manufacturers' Regulations by changing
the cut-off dates for both labor and materials to July 25, 1951, and by requiring the
inclusion of all costs, including overhead, rather than merely direct manufacturing
costs. Second, it entitled any manufacturer, whether or not subject to the Man-
ufacturers' Regulations, to apply for individual ceiling price increases on the basis
of this new formula.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the Capehart Amendment, in effect,
2' Supra, note 6.
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gave explicit Congressional approval to the principle of a cut-off date and to the
rejection of continued, automatic cost escalation. Consequently, it became possible
for OPS to retain the principle of this essential standard for the remainder of the
control program.
The amendment did, however, make it necessary for the agency to take a series
of actions to implement its provisions. After some delay, reflecting uncertainty as
to whether Congress would comply with the President's request to repeal the
amendment, OPS decided that the only practical course was to amend the Manu-
facturers' Regulations to permit calculations to be made in accordance with the new
formula as an alternative to the rules previously established. In reaching this con-
clusion, OPS was confronted with several important questions of policy. The first
involved the decision as to whether the use of the Capehart formula should be an
alternative to, or a mandatory substitute for, that prescribed in the original regula-
tions. There were numerous cases in which costs as of July 26, i95i were lower
than those on previously specified cut-off dates. In addition, increases in volume
meant that overhead costs for many manufacturers, as of July 26, were lower than
they had been before Korea. Consequently, the mandatory application of the
Capehart formula would have resulted in lower ceilings in a considerable number
of cases than those originally provided. After considerable thought, however, OPS
decided that it would be too much of a hardship to require manufacturers who
had gone through the somewhat cumbersome calculations required in the original
regulations, to scrap these and start all over again on a new basis. Consequently,
it was decided to allow each manufacturer to choose between the two alternative
methods.
The second major question arose because many manufacturers urged strongly
that changes in overhead costs should be computed in terms of changes in the ele-
ments going into overhead only, without any allowance for the effect of changes
in volume. This position was, of course, advanced most strongly by those in-
dustries whose production and sales had increased sharply since Korea. OPS, how-
ever, had little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the Congressional intent,
normal accounting practice, and the needs of sound administration all required that
changes in volume must be included in the determination of unit overhead.
In addition to modifying the Manufacturers' Regulations, it was also necessary
to issue regulations permitting other manufacturers to apply for individual adjust-
ments as required by the third sentence of the amendment. The standards provided
for these applications followed the same broad principles as those included in the
amendments to the Manufacturers' Regulations.
At the time the Manufacturers' Regulations were issued, it had been contemplated
that they would be essentially interim measures to be followed as rapidly as possible
by tailored regulations for as many industries as possible. The uncertainties which
followed the temporary extension of the Act and later the assessment of the impact
of the Capehart Amendment, together with the possibility that the amendment
might be modified, slowed this process very considerably.
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Until October, 1951, there were no explicit standards instructing officials as to
the principles to be used in formulating tailored regulations, other than those im-
plicit in the Manufacturers' Regulations themselves. On October =, 1951, "Tenta-
tive Operating Instructions" were finally issued in the form of Price Operations
Memorandum No. 13. This memorandum started by stating that "The program
of OPS still gives highest priority to the preparation of tailored regulations." After
describing the various forms which such tailored regulations could take, it set forth
standards with respect to the levels to be established in such regulations.
POM 13 laid considerable stress on the desirability of providing rollbacks in
tailored regulations-subject, of course, to the limitations imposed by the law and
particularly by the Capehart Amendment. This emphasis on rollbacks, however,
proved largely ineffective. It is difficult, in fact, to mention a single instance in which
a tailored regulation issued subsequent to POM 13 actually incorporated any sig-
nificant rollback in accordance with these instructions. Both OPA and OPS ex-
perience has clearly demonstrated the extreme practical difficulties involved in rolling
back price ceilings once they have been firmly established. Rollbacks had been
difficult enough in the spring of I95i , though a limited number had been made
effective; by the time POM 13 was issued, successful new rollbacks could scarcely
be expected.
In the absence of any significant rollback actions, the principal issues encountered
in the interpretation and application of the standards of POM 13 focused on the
methods to be used in establishing industry-wide ceilings for commodities under the
GCPR and the Manufacturers' Regulations.
These arose in good part because the ceiling prices established for individual
companies under the general regulations varied considerably. In some instances, the
market situation was such that each company could actually realize its individual
ceiling, but more commonly the companies with higher ceilings could not, in fact,
obtain them. Often the lowest ceiling established for any substantial producer
represented the effective ceiling for the entire industry. This was particularly true
with respect to standard commodities, especially where there was normally a high
degree of price uniformity, as in the case of tin cans or plate glass. OPS was under
great pressure in such cases to establish a uniform ceiling on the basis of some sort
of average of the ceilings for all producers. Ordinarily, this would have meant a
substantial increase in the actual level of selling prices for the industry.
POM 13 provided that ceilings in tailored regulations designed to replace those
established under GCPR could be set on a weighted average basis. However,
tailored ceilings, intended to supersede those calculated under the Manufacturers'
Regulations, were to be set at the lowest level at which substantial volume occurred.
There was considerable evidence that many of the ceilings individually established
under the Manufacturers' Regulations were on the generous side and there were
thus no a priori reasons for assuming that the lowest ceiling established for any
substantial producer could not be regarded as equitable for the industry as a whole.
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Consequently, while this position was not universally adhered to, it was followed
in the great majority of cases. A similar view, for essentially similar reasons, was
taken with respect to ceiling prices established in conformity with the Capehart
Amendment. Higher levels were granted only upon a showing that the industry
was entitled to an increase under the earnings standard.
D. Services
In the broad field of services, it was believed impossible to handle the problems
resulting from the freeze on the basis of any form of industry-wide action. Most
services, and virtually all consumer services, represent essentially local industries,
serving pprely local markets and with cost structures reflecting largely local condi-
tions. Even within any particular town or city there were often wide variations
between the positions in which different service establishments of the same kind
found themselves. The difficulties of the problem were accentuated by the fact that
small establishments constituted a very large proportion of the membership of most
service trades.
In view of these circumstances, the general policy adopted by OPS in this field
was to permit individual service establishments to apply for adjustment of their
ceiling prices whenever they could demonstrate substantial financial hardship. When
CPR 34,26 the general services regulation, was first issued on May ii, 195i, the ad-
justment provision was very general in character and required a showing that the
financial hardship was such as to threaten the applicant's ability to continue to
supply the service, and also denied adjustments where an increase in the applicant's
price would "create or tend to create a need for increases in the prices of other
sellers. .. ."
Since the Capehart Amendment applied to service establishments as well as to
manufacturers and processors, it was necessary to modify this provision. Actually,
the revised adjustment provision which was incorporated in Amendment 2 to Ceil-
ing Price Regulation 34, dated January 9, I952,2 went considerably beyond the
specific requirements of.the Capehart Amendment. It provided in general for the
maintenance of the pre-Korean level of earnings, calculated as a percentage over
operating costs, and it did not have any cut-off date.
The reasons for this considerably greater liberality were primarily related to the
predominance of small business in most of the trades involved. Most of these
smaller establishments did not maintain the kinds of records which would be needed
for a precise application of the principles of the Capehart Amendment. In the case
of manufacturing industry, the justification for ceiling price increases to take
account of rising costs after July 26, i95i, could be appraised in terms of the In-
dustry Earnings Standard; for the service trades, such an approach would have
been impractical and the delays involved in conducting industry earning surveys
would have imposed serious hardship on small companies with limited resources.
20 x6 FED. REG. 4446 (i95').
27 17 FED. REG. 288 (x952).
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ADJUSTMENT STANDARDS
One of the major problems of price regulation is that of determining when
changes in established price ceilings must be made in order to preserve general
fairness and equity, to relieve excessive individual hardship, or to avoid interfering
with essential production. The rules under which such determinations can be
made are among the most essential standards of any price control operation. The
standards developed by OPS for this purpose included the Industry Earnings Stand-
ard, the Product Standard, the Essential Supply Standard, and provisions of the
type included in General Overriding Regulation io,28 which may be called the
Individual Relief Standard. These were all patterned after similar rules which had
been adopted by OPA.
A. Relief of Individual Hardship
Chronologically, the first of these problems to be handled was that of relieving
cases of individual hardship in the field of manufacturing. When the General Man-
ufacturers' Regulation (CPR 22) was issued on April 25, x95i , it included a provision
permitting individual companies to apply for relief if, as a result of their ceiling
prices, they would be operating at an over-all loss. The provision did not cover
cases where such a loss was due to seasonal, non-recurring, or temporary factors; to
reductions of production volume below normal economic capacity; to the payment
of unlawful wages or salaries or excessive prices for materials; to abnormally high
factory or general overhead costs; or to transactions with affiliated companies not
resulting from arm's-length bargaining.
On May ii, 195r, General Overriding Regulation No. io was issued which ex-
tended similar treatment to all manufacturers. The standard established for relief
was the restoration of a break-even position, with the further restriction that the
adjusted price level would not be substantially out of line with that of competing
sellers.
On June 7, 1951, this regulation was amended to permit adjustments to be made
either for an entire company or for a separate plant or factory.20 On April 15, 1952,
General Overriding Regulation No. io was further modified.30 On the one hand,
the requirement that the loss must not be due to reduction in volume below normal
economic capacity was eliminated. At the same time, the regulation was changed
to provide that the adjusted prices must be in line with those charged by competitors
instead of "substantially in line." The purpose of the original restriction with re-
spect to uneconomically low operation was to prevent abnormally high costs from
being reflected in adjusted ceiling prices. However, according to the Statement
of Considerations accompafiying this Amendment, "adjustments based on abnormally
high costs are restricted by the requirement that the adjusted ceiling price be in
line. Since this 'in line' requirement is tightened by this Amendment, there is no
further need for the limitation with regard to reduction in volume."
This relief provision was restricted to manufacturers. It was not needed in con-
28 16 FED. REG. 4455 (r951)- 291d. 2t 5478 (1951). so 17 FED. REG- 3380 0I952)-
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nection with service establishments because the General Services Regulation-CPR
34-provided an adequate vehicle for handling problems arising in that field.
The application of a similar provision to distributors presented very serious
practical difficulties. Moreover, the fact that distributors' prices were generally
established on a margin basis meant that in the great majority of cases distributors'
ceiling prices were reasonably in line with each other and this tended to reduce the
need for and utility of this sort of hardship relief. Consequently, formulation of a
comparable provision for distributors was delayed for a long time, and it was not
finally issued until December i, 1952, as General Overriding Regulation No. 4o?'
B. The Industry Earnings Standard
Probably the most important single OPS standard was the Industry Earnings
Standard. This standard was designed to determine when and to what extent an
industry-wide adjustment of ceiling prices was necessary in order to conform with
the statutory requirement that ceiling prices must be "generally fair and equitable."
On April 21, I951, Economic Stabilization Administrator Johnston sent a directive
to Mr. DiSalle to the effect that ceiling prices should thereafter be adjusted only
in accordance with the provisions of an earnings standard which he outlined: Under
this standard, an industry would be entitled to increases in ceiling prices if and to
the extent that its earnings fell below 85 per cent of their average level for the
three best years out of the four year period, 1946 through 1949, adjusted for changes
in net worth. OPS was instructed to prepare detailed rules for the application of
this standard. Due largely to the extreme pressure of other work, however, these
detailed rules were not actually promulgated until February 15, 1952. In effect
this standard meant that an industry was not entitled to an increase in ceiling prices
as long as its members remained, on the average, in the excess profits tax bracket.
This was essentially the same policy as had been adopted by OPA and which had
then been similarly related to the provisions of the wartime excess profits tax.
This standard was, from the start, under severe attack from many representatives
of industry. This attack generally focused upon two points, one involving the
general principles of any such standard, and the other, the specific form which this
standard took.
The first and more general criticism was to the effect that the earnings standard
constituted "profit control" and that the entire concept of requiring cost absorption
was wrong in principle. As pointed out in the discussion of the Manufacturers'
Regulations, however, there can be no effective price control if automatic cost esca-
lation is permitted. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the ability of industry
to absorb increased costs is limited. It is difficult to see how any objective test can
be devised of the extent to which any industry can absorb cost increases without
some reference to earnings.
Obviously, any form of price control must have an impact on profits. The
Industry Earnings Standard, however, measured the need for price adjustment in
" ld. at xo86o (1952).
574 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
terms of the experience of an entire industry. It did not, therefore, impair signifi-
candy the incentive to efficient operation for any individual company in that in-
dustry nor did it limit individual company profits except to the extent that they
affected the industry aggregate.
The principal criticism of detail was that the standard referred to profits before
taxes rather than profits after taxes. It was argued strongly that the concept of
profits after taxes was unreal and that the only significant figure from the point
of view of company operations was what was left after taxes had been paid.
The point was urged most emphatically by members of the steel industry in
connection with the use of the Industry Earnings Standard as applied to the steel
price-wage controversy during the spring of 1952. In the same connection, the
Industry Earnings Standard was severely criticized by the industry for the refusal to
recognize accelerated amortization of facilities in so far as it exceeded normal rates
of depreciation. Both these points are discussed at some length in another article in
this seriesO2 For reasons set forth in that article, it seemed clear to OPS that these
objections had no validity.
Despite these and other criticisms, therefore, the Office of Price Stabilization con-
tinued to apply the Industry Earnings Standard as its major test in determining the
need for industry-wide price increases. It defended this standard before the com-
mittees of Congress when the Defense Production Act was up for renewal in X952.
In the face of considerable pressure from industry, Congress refused to take action
that would require OPS to modify this standard. It may be added that a very sim-
ilar OPA standard had been upheld by the courts as an appropriate method of de-
termining whether ceiling prices were "generally fair and equitable."
The standard was, however, very severely tested following directives which were
issued by the Director of Defense Mobilization to raise ceiling prices for steel and
for copper wire and brass mill products by amounts substantially in excess of any
that could be justified opa the basis of industry earnings. The metal fabricating in-
dustries, notably machinery, argued that they, too, were entitled to more liberal
treatment than that provided by the Industry Earnings Standard, both because they
had to pay these higher prices for basic metals and because they were affected by
the rapid spread of the wage increase pattern which had been set by steel. It was
also urged that it was unfair to permit a breach of standards for a large and powerful
industry such as steel but to maintain them firmly for smaller industries that were
not able to exert similar economic and political pressure.
Despite the undeniable force of these contentions, OPS simply could not take
the course of abandoning the earnings standard for the metal working industries.
This was precisely the area in which price pressures were greatest and where con-
trols seemed most needed at the time. It should be emphasized, moreover, that the
price increases which had been granted to the steel and copper industries were al-
lowed by OPS only on the basis of directives from higher government levels and
32 See Wolf and Keller, Problems of the Industry Earnings Standard, infra, 58x-603.
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that these directives explicitly provided for the maintenance of its standards in con-
nection with further actions.
While the abandonment of the earnings standard would have been disastrous,
particularly in the absence of any suitable substitute rule, equity still seemed to
demand some relief for the metal working industries. After exploring a wide range
of alternative possibilities, it was finally decided to take the relatively simple course
of permitting the increases in metals' costs to be passed through by metal fabricators
without absorption and also without escalation. At the same time, the agency re-
affirmed its position that the earnings standard would continue to be applied to
determine whenever other kinds of cost increases, such as wage boosts, required
further adjustments in ceiling prices. Steps were also taken to expedite as far as
possible the conduct of the surveys required to support such determinations.
With the exception of this metals "pass through," the Industry Earnings Standard
remained to the end of the control period the basic working rule of the agency in
determining the need for industry-wide price adjustments. Whether it should have
been modified or supplemented in the light of prevailing conditions raises important
questions which are discussed very briefly below.
C. The Product Standard
The earnings standard measured the adequacy of the general price level for an
industry. It did not, however, take care of situations in which an individual product
or product line might be unprofitable even though over-all industry earnings were
adequate.
To take care of problems of this kind, OPA had adopted a standard which re-
quired that the price for each separate product or product line of an industry must
be high enough to cover the out-of-pocket costs of the bulk of the producers. Diffi-
culties with application of this standard led to its being modified by adoption of a
working rule to the effect that the price must equal the weighted average of manu-
facturing costs.
The situation confronting OPS was somewhat different in this respect from that
which had prevailed during wartime. The entire political and economic climate
in 1951 and 1952 made the adoption of the strict OPA rule seem impractical. More-
over, in the absence of the rigid wartime controls over production, manufacturers
could much more readily shift out of lines on which the price covered no more
than manufacturing costs without any allowance for such items as general over-
head or sales expense.
Consequently, the OPS Product Standard, as issued on April 22, 1952, provided
that prices for a product or product line would be adjusted when ceiling prices
did not cover the weighted average total costs for all manufacturers producing that
product.
At the time it was issued, it was not expected that this standard would be used
extensively because it was anticipated that the Industry Earnings Standard would
take care of most of the problems which might arise. This expectation was borne
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out in practice. There were very few cases in which the Product Standard as such
was actually invoked. This was probably due to two principal reasons. In the first
place, the prevalence of soft markets in a large sector of the economy meant that
ceiling prices could not actually be realized for a wide range of goods, including
almost all consumer soft goods and a large part of consumers' durables. Second,
pressures were most acute in the field of metal products, but most of these could
qualify for more liberal treatment under the Essential Supply regulation than under
the Product Standard.
This does not mean that a Product Standard might not be needed under a con-
dition of general inflationary pressure. The fact that it proved of very little value
under OPS largely reflected the mixed economic situation which prevailed after
the standard was issued.
D. Essential Supply Standard
Late in i951, OPS was subjected to rapidly increasing pressure to provide a
means for ensuring that price ceilings did not interfere with the production of
commodities essential to the defense program or to the basic civilian economy. The
great bulk of these pressures originated in the field of machinery and industrial
metal products. The problems were generally of a kind which related to individual
products or product lines rather than to the total operations of an industry. More-
over, the difficulties were frequently confined to single companies or groups of
companies rather than to all the producers of the products in question.
Application of the Product Standard to situations of this kind could not meet
the problem for two reasons. In the first place, as indicated above, the difficulties
were often confined to one or a few producers. Second, since the Product Standard
did not provide any profit margin, it could not prevent shifts of production. In this
connection, it should be remembered that the Product Standard was based on the
weighted average of the costs of all producers of the item so that some would still
be selling the product at a loss.
In order to take care of situations of this kind, General Overriding Regulation 29
was issued on May 23, i952. In effect, it provided a sort of combination of Earnings
Standard and Product Standard relief on an individual company basis. Where the
earnings of a company were more than 85 per cent of its average for its three most
profitable years through 1946-1949, the ceiling price for the product or product line
in question would be adjusted to cover total costs. Where the rate of return was
below that level, a normal rate of profit would be allowed.
The regulation also made even more liberal provision for items of outstanding
importance to the defense program. In such cases, prices would be adjusted to pro-
vide a normal profit regardless of the over-all rate of return being earned by the
company.
This standard was widely used and a large number of adjustments was granted
under its provisions. In addition to individual adjustments granted under GOR 29,
33 i7 FED. REG. 4762 (1952).
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the standards established in the regulation were also used in a number of special
cases to grant industry-wide adjustments for products of outstanding essentiality.
This was done, for example, in the case of aluminum and ferrochrome. While this
way of applying the standard had not been contemplated at the time the regulation
was written, such action conformed with the principles which had been established,
and proved a useful means of dealing with what would otherwise have been very
difficult situations.
DECONTROL AND SUSPENSION STANDARDS
In addition to standards needed for the administration of price controls, rules
also had to be developed for determining when commodities or services should be
exempted from controls or when ceilings should be suspended.
The techniques of exemption and suspension should not be confused since they
were addressed to two different kinds of situations. In general, commodities or
services were exempted from controls when the burden of retaining controls clearly
outweighed any possible benefits to the stabilization program. The possibility
that prices might rise above ceilings following exemption was therefore only a very
secondary consideration. Suspension, on the other hand, was used where market
prices were substantially below ceilings; where ceilings could not practically be re-
duced; and where there was little, if any, likelihood that prices would rise to or
above ceilings. In other words, the principal consideration involved in exemption
was the nature of the commodity or service concerned, whereas in suspension, it was
the level of the established ceiling price as related to the realities of the market.
In the course of any program of general price control (as distinguished from
selective control) it is necessary to determine which commodities, services, and sellers
should be exempted. While no market transaction can be viewed in complete isola-
tion, there are many whose impact on the broad objectives of any stabilization pro-
gram are minuscule. Many other transactions, while of more individual importance,
are still such that they do not warrant the administrative effort or the burden upon
business which would be needed to control them effectively. There are still others
whose nature is such that no practical means of effective control can be devised.
Sound administration requires that transactions of this kind should be exempted.
Such exemptions may relate to certain commodities or services or to certain classes
of sellers.
Considerable care must be exercised, however, in formulating exemption policy.
This is particularly true during periods of acute general inflationary pressure, when
every business and every industry compete for the scarce supply of materials, man-
power, and other resources. For example, it may be argued that luxuries, such as
expensive fur coats, can safely be exempted regardless of the general situation and
that uncontrolled price increases for such items would, in effect, be desirable since
this would lessen the demand for more essential consumer goods. In a really tight
situation, however, exemption of such luxuries from control would tend to divert
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needed resources to their production, though if pressures were milder and more
spotty, exemption might be justified.
This danger is by no means theoretical. This may be illustrated by the curious
case of Salt Flat Lake Herring which confronted OPS late in 195i. Prices paid
by processors for the raw herring had risen substantially as a result of buying compe-
tition by mink farmers. Consequently, OPS found it necessary, on December 21,
i951, to issue Ceiling Price Regulation 0934 raising the price of the processed her-
ring, which was an important food item, particularly for low income families.
This sort of problem was, of course, exceptional. Under the economic condi-
tions which prevailed during most of the life of OPS, a fairly liberal policy with
respect to the exemption of luxuries was appropriate. In fact, it seems probable that
the agency did not move rapidly enough in this direction.
Similarly, when the economic situation is such that competitive pressures are at
least moderately effective, fairly generous small business exemptions can be safely
granted on the assumption that, as long as larger companies are controlled, prices
cannot get badly out of line. In a situation such as prevailed during the war, on
the other hand, competition cannot be relied upon in this way and small business
exemptions must be approached more cautiously.
This does not mean that there are not many cases in which exemptions are ap-
propriate, regardless of the degree of inflationary pressure existing. For example,
there is little point in expending administrative effort at any time on items of
such very minor importance as hand decorated used bottles, or hand fans, or pin-
cushions. The same is true of very small producers such as those engaged in home-
work industries. Nor can any effective control be exercised in some very important
areas, such as the sale of farm produce by the farmer.
In the case of OPS, some exemptions were included in the General Ceiling Price
Regulation itself and others followed shortly thereafter. The initial standards for
exemption were contained in Price Operations Memorandum No. 5 which was
issued on August 5, i95i. At the time, the general economic situation still seemed
generally tight and the' standards were correspondingly rigid. They authorized
exemption only in the case of materials and services which were "wholly insignifi-
cant" and then only if continuation of control would impose a significant burden on
administration or business. Later, as the general situation eased, these standards
were somewhat liberalized to permit, in effect, an appraisal of whether control
imposed a burden on OPS or business "disproportionate in relation to the effective-
ness of the control or the contribution to the price stabilization program."
In the field of small business, the GCPR itself contained certain very limited
exemptions for homework industry; subsequent actions exempted manufacturers
whose sales did not exceed $25,000 annually. Serious consideration was given dur-
ing 1952 to exempting a large number of smaller retailers and service establishments.
While numerous proposals of this kind were drawn up, they had not yet been ap-
proved when the liquidation of controls was ordered by the President.
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Whereas any price control program must consider the need for appropriate ex-
emptions, OPS suspension policy was addressed to the specific conditions which
prevailed during the latter part of the agency's life. It became evident late in 1951
that market prices for many commodities were substantially below the price ceilings
which had been established. Legislative restrictions and practical considerations
precluded reducing ceilings to correspond with market conditions.
Consequently, during February, 1952, Price Director DiSalle appointed an ad
hoc committee to develop standards for action in cases of this kind. The first such
standard was issued on April 22, 1952, relating to raw materials, and on August 21,
1952, it was expanded to include manufactured goods. In general, these rules pro-
vided that ceilings be suspended where prices were "materially below ceiling" and
where there was "no prospect that re-imposition of controls would be necessary in
the foreseeable future." The standard also provided that whenever a commodity
was suspended, a "price watching system" should be established. The suspension
was to be revoked whenever market prices rose toward the suspended ceilings and
reached predetermined "trigger points" which were to be established at the same
time as the suspension action. In fact, no suspensions ever had to be restored
because of an advance of prices to the "trigger point." There was only one revoca-
tion of any suspension action, and that was for administrative reasons involving
difficulty in defining the commodity area covered, coupled with adverse impact on
the enforceability of a related regulation.
CONCLUSIONS AND APPRAISAL
On the basis of actual experience, it may be concluded that the administrative
standards used by OPS performed their necessary function reasonably well in most
cases. It is equally clear, however, that this general conclusion must be subject
to important reservations.
In the first place, economic trends during the life of OPS were such as to avert
any really severe, comprehensive test of the standards. In those cases in which
the standards were subjected to serious pressure, such as the steel, copper, and
aluminum cases, the agency often had to accept a limited retreat. But despite these
exceptions, OPS standards, once they were formalized, did generally serve their
basic purpose of providing practical rules for consistent action.
Had inflationary pressure been stronger and more general, however, many of
the standards would probably have proved untenable without major modification,
unless other government controls had been sufficiently tightened to preserve a reason-
ably stable structure of costs. For example, it is doubtful that the Industry Earnings
Standard could have been retained without important change as the basic rule for
measuring the ability of industries to absorb cost increases. The large and rapidly
increasing number of earnings standard cases which developed during the last half
of 1952 subjected the standard to stresses for which it was not well designed. These
stresses would obviously have been far greater had it not been for the prevalence of
soft markets in a large part of the economy.
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It seems entirely probable, in fact, that if controls had not been permitted to
expire early in 1953, a general reappraisal and revision of the OPS hardship stand-
ards would have become necessary, despite the large areas of market softness. The
test of a new wage increase for steel such as was agreed to in June, 1953, would have
been very difficult to meet (unless, of course, wage controls had also been continued
and could have succeeded in blocking that increase). Moreover, the growing num-
ber of industries which had received earnings standard adjustments would in gen-
eral have had to be allowed to pass subsequent cost increases through, in full, and
without any further absorption. To the extent this would have happened, the earn-
ings standard would have been automatically transformed into a pass-through stand-
ard.
As mentioned earlier, OPS standards were in large part patterned after those.
which had been employed by OPA, with modifications which were, on the whole, of
relatively minor character. In retrospect, it would appear that sharper and bolder
departures from the OPA pattern would have been appropriate, in view of the
fundamental differences in economic and political conditions between the two
periods.
In summary, just as OPA experience with administrative standards proved of
great value to OPS, so the combined OPA-OPS experience should prove very useful
if a price control program is again needed. However, OPS may have followed the
general OPA line of policy too uncritically, and with inadequate adaptation to the
basically different political and economic situation.
Advance planning for a possible future emergency should therefore stress the
principle that administrative standards must take due cognizance of all elements of
the environment in which they will operate, and must be subject to modification to
conform with any radical changes in that environment. And the OPS experience
clearly indicates that such advance planning is of the highest importance to ensure
the maintenance of a consistent and effective program.
